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Gendered Reflections? Extremism in the UK’s Radical Right
and al-Muhajiroun Networks
Elizabeth Pearson
School of Law and Criminology, Swansea University, Wales, UK
ABSTRACT
The rise of populism and the radical right alongside ongoing global
recruitment by jihadist groups has seen academics and popular dis-
course alike note parallels between the two. In particular, authors
have emphasized gendered similarities between the movements.
Based on ‘close-up’ ethnographic research, this article empirically
shows how gender produces group members’ activism in two
extreme movements: a network linked to the U.K.’s banned Islamist
group al-Muhajiroun; and activists for the English Defence League,
Britain First and other anti-Islam(ist) groups. Through a gendered
analysis, the article problematizes assertions that the two move-
ments mirror one another. In particular, it emphasizes the ways in
which gender produces fragmentation across the anti-Islam(ist)
movement, contrasted with a more consistent gendered logic in
those networked to al-Muhajiroun. Its key contribution is to use
ethnographic research to evidence the ways in which group mem-
bers’ gendered activism ultimately undercuts group ideals.
“Islamophobia is fear of Islam, and people should be afraid”.
Interview, Akash, 6 February 2017
“The rapid growth of militant Islam is leading to the suppression of women, freedom of
speech and racist attacks. . .We will make Britain a beautiful country once again where you
can leave your door unlocked and your children can play in the streets.”1
Britain First, Mission Statement
Introduction
Gender matters in understanding terrorism and extremism, and this goes beyond simple
considerations of women’s roles in violent groups. Gender is evident in extremist narra-
tives, and ideology. Daesh propaganda has for instance portrayed jihadi men as ‘real’
men, contrasted with male emasculation in the West.2 Meanwhile, nationalist violence
has long relied on constructed dichotomies of insider/outsider, masculine/feminine, and
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the masculine/male read as superior to and protective of the feminine/female.3
Extremism is not limited to one ideology. Yet at different times, different forms of
extremism are more prevalent, and attract greater government attention. In 2017, the
U.K. experienced four major terrorist attacks, three of which were inspired by Salafi-
jihadist ideology, and one – an attack on London mosque-goers - by opposition to
Islam. Together, these attacks led to some 40 deaths. Since then, the British
Government has increased pressures on the far right, as this threat is growing.4 The
intelligence services now lead investigation of far right threats, under a counter-
terrorism remit.5 At the same time, the counter-radicalization policy, Prevent, initially
aimed at the prevention of Islamist violence, is increasingly applied to the far right.
Additionally, authors have suggested these movements share gendered norms and prac-
tices. For instance, that they embody similar ‘toxic’ attitudes to women, adhere to a
strict gender binary in which the roles of men and women are oppositional and dis-
tinct,6 and that their ideologies mirror one another in gendered ways.7
This paper engages with this ‘similarity’ hypothesis, using ethnographic methods to
explore gender in two of the most significant movements designated extreme in the
U.K. at this time: the anti-Islam(ist) radical right, opposed to the perceived Islamization
of Britain and Europe; and an Islamist network linked to and including Anjem
Choudary and al-Muhajiroun (ALM). This paper challenges assertions of straightfor-
ward gender parity between these movements, using field research to evidence the prac-
tical ways in which extreme activists understand, interpret, perform, and enact ideology
and ideals. It outlines: the ways in which gender produces tensions and fragmentations
in the radical right scene; the diversity of masculinities evident in both movements; and
the ways in which feminisms are co-opted and women’s roles and rights celebrated in
the movements. It adds nuance to existing studies of gender in ideology; and through
study of practice, reveals some dissimilarities in gender between the movements.
Importantly, the contribution of this paper, is that it also exposes the ways in which the
practical exigencies of group participation and daily action undercut group ideals.
The paper considers how much participants adhere to an ideological gender binary,
with rigid and essentialized roles for women and men, and the ways in which that is
disrupted in practice. Through a granular approach to the U.K. extreme scene, this
study reveals the ways in which class, race, faith and gender intersect in participants’
narratives, and reveal the complexities of their participation. It explores the ways that
extreme identities are forged in the intersections of subordinated race, class and gender.
In these liminal spaces, in which multiple subordinate identities overlap, extremist
activism is born. The paper argues that while the two movements share some gen-
dered features, there are parameters to what they have in common. It begins with a
discussion of the difficulties inherent in the study of extremsim, and in particular,
gendered extremism, and presents a brief methodology. The next section presents the
findings, in three parts: first, it explores gendered fragmentation in the radical right,
and the various contradictory gender narratives emergent from ‘influencers’, as well as
the wider activist scene; second, the paper engages with the network linked to al-
Muhajiroun, referencing Anjem Choudary, the sole Islamist influencer interviewed,
and the Islamist network linked to him. This includes members of his inner circle, as
well as those on the peripheries, linked in for example via social media. Finally, I
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discuss the significance of the findings and their importance for a nuanced counter-
terrorism and counter-extremism approach.
Gender is the guiding framework for this piece. Too often, security studies has either
ignored the role of gender, or understood gender as synonymous with women. Gender
is not just about women. It concerns power, masculinities, norms and how these
entwine; it is, as Scott writes, “a way of referring to the social organization of the rela-
tionship between the sexes.”8 It is also, this article suggests, an appropriate approach to
the two movements studied, given that they are– particularly in the public space - not-
ably homosocial.
Part I: Extremism and Gender: A Fundamental Relationship?
A great many authors have by now written on gender in extremism, particularly within
the far right, and Islamism. Scholarship has tended to discussion of gender in extrem-
ism – and particularly extremist ideology - in two distinct ways: first, on women, and
second, in a separate body of literature, through a consideration of masculinities.
Existing work has found similarities. It has noted the relative dominance of men in
both movements; the reliance of both on gender binaries, in roles and in ideology; the
use of violent groups to assert particular forms of masculine status; and the agency of
women in supporting both violence and anti-feminist themes in jihadist and far
right groups.
Studies of gender in Islamist and in particular jihadist groups have tended to explor-
ation of women’s roles and agency, noting that long-standing essentialist assumptions
that women are not involved in jihad are incorrect. Research has evidenced the support
many women have for violent Islamist groups, and their roles within them, whether
fund-raising, propagandizing, traveling to join Daesh, fighting (more rarely) and carry-
ing out suicide bomb attacks.9 There is also work which engages with the structural
constraints on women, and the patriarchal nature of jihadist ideology, noting the ways
in which jihadist groups construct and mobilize a binary gendered logic, and the
according separation of men’s and women’s roles.10 Additionally, Lahoud has noted the
ways in which women are excluded from jihad, in spite of theology.11 This does not
mean they do not promote violence, however, often shaming men into action.12
Similarly, those working on women’s roles in the far right, have outlined the possibil-
ities for women joining white supremacist, Nazi and radical right groups – despite the
homosociality of such groups - and their findings mirror those above. While fewer in
number, and often without leadership powers, many far right women embrace roles of
domesticity, what Hardisty termed “kitchen sink activism.”13 Nationalist movements
have long constructed violence around dichotomies of insider/outsider, masculine/fem-
inine, the masculine/male always read as superior to and protective of the feminine/
women.14 Feminist scholars have emphasized the ways in which states have used such
binaries to go to war, invoking mythic characters across a variety of global contexts,
Marianne in France for instance, or Britannia in Great Britain.15 The vulnerable and
protected woman is necessary to preserve men’s ‘protector’ status.16
One key complexity of work on gender and the far right is the terminology used. A
diverse array of groups are frequently referred to as ‘far right’, however, they do not
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uniformly share features and can take positions across a spectrum of beliefs. Gendered
ideology is not uniform, an important consideration when attempting to generalize
more broadly from findings with any one group, or when seeking to use literature on
gender in one subsection of the movement, to better understand another. Indeed,
Spierings and Zaslove regard anti-Islam(ism) and the so-called ‘counter-jihad’ move-
ment opposing Islam as incorporating two contradictory gendered ideologies: traditional
gender narratives of historical extreme right groups locating the honor of the nation in
its women, in tension with narratives of Western gender equality and freedoms for gay
people. Both narratives are used as evidence of Western cultural superiority over Islam
and its perceived norms.17 Lange and M€ugge distinguish between these two positions,
labeling them ‘nationalist’ and ‘neo-liberal’.18 This problematizes claims that anti-
Islam(ist) groups on the radical right are a straightforward continuation of fascism, for
instance, as Feldman suggests, that the EDL is ‘old wine in new bottles’.
In mostly separate work, authors have also considered masculinities in extremism,
employing masculinities theorist Connell’s most powerful concept: hegemonic mascu-
linity. Hegemonic masculinity is an aspirational masculinity, positioned relative to
other subordinate or marginalized masculinities; the concept emphasizes the core fea-
ture of masculinities, which is that they are relational.19 Gendered identities are
socially constructed within a matrix of masculinities and femininities.20 Authors have
engaged with work on masculinities on the far right for some years, noting the ways
in which this can be a homosocial scene, embodying masculinist cultures.21
Scholarship has outlined the ways in which themes of globalization, or of personal
and collective emasculation inform raced and classed identities in the mobilization
toward white supremacist groups.22 This is often framed with reference to a ‘crisis’ of
masculinity, seen in shifting global gender norms postglobalization, which are resisted
by white men who perceive themselves losing power.23 However, Busher cautions
against simplistic understandings of the function of masculinity in study of the radical
right; even where assertions of “angry, white, damaged and vulnerable” men contain a
“kernel of truth”, blanket assumptions are not justified.24 Additionally, authors have
also outlined the ways in which masculinities are not the sole province of men, but
are performed by women too.25
Growing numbers of authors are using masculinity studies to study jihadist extrem-
ism, exploring the effects of gender as a series of power relations.26 For instance,
authors including Popovski, Aslam, Duriesmith, Ismail, Messerschmidt, Rohde,
Sageman and Hegghammer have discussed the importance and variety of jihadist mas-
culinities across global contexts.27 Here intersectionality is crucial in recognizing that
racialized, gendered and classed identities are produced through power hierarchies.28 In
particular, gender produces cultures, actions and symbolic practice, what Bourdieu
termed ‘habitus’. It is through habitus that members of the same social field – such as
the radical right or jihadist groups - recognize their actions as having shared meaning.29
Employing an intersectional approach, Duriesmith finds gendered jihadist identities are
co-constituted in the intersections of global and local discourses and practices.30 In his
study of Indonesian jihad, for example, Duriesmith evidenced the ways in which global
jihadist masculinities both subordinate local masculinities, and provide a means for men
in a localized context to achieve status.31
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There is growing academic work addressing these two key movements, the far right
and Islamism, together; yet only a few authors have focused on gender. Drawing again
on intersectional studies, masculinities author Michael Kimmel advocates gender as a
structural approach to consider movements together, enabling exploration of the social
relationships co-constituting movements, rather than a ‘side-by-side’ comparison.32
Kimmel’s comparative work emphasizes a commonality of masculinities evident in both
the far right and Islamism. In another comparison, Mattheis and Winter also note par-
allels in narratives employed in an identitarian and Daesh narrative. Both ideologies
exhibited what the authors term ‘gender complementarity’ (an essentialist gender binary,
asserting opposing and complementary roles for women and men); the shared promo-
tion of the ‘domestic ideal’ for women; and the shared assertion of patriarchy as a path
to societal stability.33 Authors including Ebner and Smith have also suggested extremists
of both movements mirror one another, in terms of gender binaries and ideology, or
‘toxic masculinity’.34
Despite this growing work the relationship between extremism and broader under-
standings of gender remains underexplored. In particular, this study aims to address the
lack of comparative research between movements. This paper’s contribution is its
empirical exploration of extremist group members’ real-world understandings and inter-
pretations of ideology, exposing the gendered tensions between the two. Additionally, it
considers the intersections between structure and agency, masculinities and ideology
and the activities of individual activists, as related in a series of interviews and field
research. It therefore engages with the holistic function of gender in shaping the actions
of both men and women together. This is particularly important if, as authors including
Ezekiel suggest, movements are dominated by masculine cultures; one aim here, there-
fore, is to explore how gender creates cultures and shapes behaviors, potentially limiting
or enabling the participation of women, and men. This allows the piece to consider the
points of divergence between groups in gender norms and actions, rather than the
points of similarity.
Groups Studied
One of the key purposes of this research was to consider the degree to which assertions
of parity in the gendered ideologies of two distinct and opposing ideologies - the U.K.’s
radical right and an Islamist network linked to al-Muhajiroun - are justified. I selected
these two movements for three reasons: firstly, they represent the key extremist move-
ments recognized in the U.K. currently; secondly, because theories of cumulative
extremism assert a causal and reciprocal relationship between them,35 although this was
not evidenced here; thirdly, because authors are increasingly suggesting that gender is at
the heart of any reciprocity in their relationship, although there are few gendered stud-
ies of either group within the U.K.36 Additionally, the British Government has applied
an extremism framework to both, transposing key gendered assumptions about
Islamism – men as key risks, women as potential allies - to responses to the far right.
However, the U.K.’s definition of extremism is highly contested, and it was therefore
important not to assume the equivalence of their behaviors, beliefs or the risks posed,
particularly, this article argues, in terms of gender.
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Many terms are used for those active against Islam – the counter-jihad, far right, alt-
right, radical right. Here, the core selection criterion for the first movement was active
opposition to Islam(ism); therefore, following Pilkington, I employ the labels anti-
Islam(ist) and radical right for these activists. Within the U.K.’s anti-Islam(ist) radical
right, the English Defence League (EDL) is a key group, and features in the research
underlying this paper. A number of participants identified with the EDL, which was
founded in 2009 by Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, also known as Tommy Robinson, as a self-
declared working-class street movement with a “single-issue” focus, to oppose “global
Islamification”.37 In 2011, another anti-Islam(ist) group, Britain First (BF), was founded
as a registered political party, with a claimed Christian identity. BF’s policy is to “disbar
followers of the Islamic ideology from holding public office”, and to deport or imprison
“anyone found to be promoting the ideology of Islam.”38 Radical right participants sup-
ported these as well as a variety of other groups, often moving between groups.
The second movement studied is al-Muhajiroun, which of the various British Islamist
groups, has been a key government concern. Associates have traveled to join Daesh, or
had their passports removed to prevent them from doing so. Indeed, the U.K.’s 2018
CONTEST strategy notes the alignment of al-Muhajiroun and Daesh ideology.39 The
British security services have identified 500 active investigations into 3,000 individuals,
with a further 20,000 people who may pose a security risk due to their endorsement of
Daesh as a brand.40 In 2004, al-Muhajiroun in the U.K. officially disbanded, and since
2006 it is a legally proscribed group under this and under names.41 ALM supporters are
ready to use violence, if necessary, but are restricted by the ‘Covenant of Security’, pro-
hibiting violence against citizens of the country they reside in.42 In November 2019,
however, a man with links to ALM killed two people in a terror attack in London.43
Numerous authors have also linked ALM to trans-national terror plots.44 In 2000, a
British man linked with Omar Bakri Mohammed and ALM, Mohammed Bilal, carried
out a suicide attack in Kashmir, killing ten.45 In September 2016 al-Muhajiroun leaders
Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman (known as Abu Baraa) were jailed for support
of Daesh. In 2018 they were released on license.
Methodology
This paper is based on qualitative research which took place from May 2016 to
February 2018 and involved some 18months of attending demonstrations, street dawah,
formal meetings, trials, people’s homes; as well as meeting in cafes and talking on the
phone. Of the 31 participants, 17 were active within the anti-Islam(ist) scene (six
women and 11 men), and 14 linked to British Islamism (four women and ten men).
Some 67 formal interviews were conducted with participants identified as active in
groups understood as ‘extreme’ in the U.K.: the EDL, BF and ALM, and associated net-
works. Informal interviews also took place with many others linked to the scenes.
Transcripts were coded in Atlas Ti, according to gendered themes.
This is therefore a small sample study, yet includes important leadership figures
described as ‘influencers’ in the piece (Anjem Choudary, Jayda Fransen, Tommy
Robinson and Anne Marie Waters). Influencers consented to identification; however,
other participants are given pseudonyms. All participants were made aware that we
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could not discuss criminal behavior, including the support of Daesh. This clearly limited
some discussion. Five of the men were jailed during the research period, for: a plot in
support of Daesh (Ahmed), allegiance to Daesh (Anjem Choudary), breach of an ASBO
(Mo), funding terrorism (Zakir) and contempt of court (Tommy Robinson). Jayda
Fransen was jailed for religiously aggravated harassment.46 Adam was charged with
downloading Daesh materials.
As noted at the outset of this piece, gender is the guiding framework for the method-
ology. This entailed an ‘empathetic’ ethnographic feminist approach of active listening,
also increasingly advocated by terrorism scholars such as Dolnik.47 This is politically
complex, given it produces an analysis which emphasizes primary source material, and
the voices and experiences of ‘extreme’ participants as those with “a privileged window
into their motivations”.48 I include transcript material that is indicative of the views of
the movements explored, and therefore offensive to many. I include transcript because
‘close-up’ research aims to critically reproduce voices often unheard, however
‘distasteful’ or ‘repugnant’, in order to interrogate and understand them.49 I do not
share participants’ political views, and we frequently challenged one another on current
affairs and other issues.
Part II: Findings
The gendered analysis of interviews developed here reveals the two movements do mir-
ror one another, but only to a limited extent. Both movements share a complex rela-
tionship with feminism, with participants both contesting and reclaiming its meaning.
Strategies used to uphold fundamentally patriarchal belief systems are rebranded as fur-
thering female agency. The range of masculinities accepted within both movements is
also perhaps broader than suggested in literature which emphasizes hyper-masculinity,
toxicity and violence.50 However, there are differences. Attitudes toward men’s and
women’s roles are not uniform in the radical right scene, leading to movement frag-
mentation. Ideology also has a different gendered function in each. Learning and know-
ledge endow masculine status in the Islamist scene, yet not in the radical right.
In dealing with the Islamist analysis, only one influencer is included, (Choudary) and
sections are therefore thematic. First, however the paper considers gender in the anti-
Islam(ism) scene. It begins with exploration of the ideology of three named leaders/
influencers, before moving to the beliefs of wider grassroots activists, who
are anonymized.
Anti-Islam(Ism): Fragmentation in Influencer Belief and Action
Three radical right influencers participated in the research: Tommy Robinson (EDL and
independent), Anne Marie Waters (For Britain) and Jayda Fransen (then Britain First).
Importantly, their stances clearly differ from Islamist gender ideals, first and foremost
because of the open visibility of women as leaders in the radical right movement. While
these three influencers share a gendered understanding of Islam as threat, they represent
three different gendered responses to this, constructed through class, sexuality and eth-
nicity. These constitute: a nationalist, working-class muscular masculinity, to which
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other masculinities, particularly liberal white and Muslim masculinities are subordinated
(Robinson); a claimed Christian opposition to the gendered abuses of Islam as false
faith (Fransen); and an explicit assertion of women’s and gay rights (Waters).
Pilkington has argued that the EDL, “… although sharing with more extreme right
movements an ultra-patriotic agenda, and being populist in its claims to promote the
concerns of ‘ordinary people’ . . does not uphold an ideology of racial supremacy and
promotes women’s and LGBT rights”. This is important in the wider movement, as the
broad assertion of secular values including gender equality, across influencer narratives
reshapes the complexion of gender in activism. While each influencer is preoccupied
with themes of race, gender and class, these discourses intersect in specific ways, reveal-
ing core differences between the groups, their methods and their likely appeal.
There are nonetheless shared themes they share. The three influencers share the
assertion of Islam as an unassimilable ideology, and in gendered terms, citing perceived
unequal gender relations, patriarchal abuses, and the oppression of women, including
as, Fransen suggests, “taking child brides and sex slaves”. They frame Islam not as a
valid religion but an ‘ideology’ seeking to subvert and threaten democracy, and in gen-
dered ways. All anti-Islam(ism) participants believe instances of the abuse of young
working-class women by predominantly Pakistani-heritage British men were ignored
because of institutional political correctness, which does not see class, only race.
Consistent with traditional nationalist ideology, all believe the state has a duty to protect
‘its’ women, defined in racial and cultural terms.
They believe the state has favored immigrant Muslim populations who are sexually
predatory. In a speech for Pegida in Dresden in October 2016 Robinson for example
stated, “Our women and children need the protection that only a strong moral society
can provide. The terrorizing of our women in towns and cities must stop… Europe
must and can remain free from the inhumanity of Islam.”51 Robinson situates the ability
to protect (particular) women at the heart of his vision of masculinity, and nationalist vir-
tue, “it’s honorable to want to protect women.”52 However, as a female leader, a key per-
sonal aim, Fransen told me, is to mobilize people to protect not women, but children.
She told a crowd of around 200 at a protest in Rochdale, “I’ve said we hold demos for
many different reasons, Shariah law, Mega mosques, FGM – but I can’t think of a greater
cause than this, our kids, systematically targeted. There is nothing greater than our child-
ren.”53 Waters also shares concerns about what she believes are insurmountable gendered
differences between immigrant Muslim men and Western Europe, which put women at
risk, she believes. The influencers use perceived differences in everyday gendered practices
– the habitus – to distinguish in-group from out-group; the degree to which others accept
these differences distinguishes ‘patriots’ from those betraying their in-group.
While framing the threat posed by Islam in similar terms – as gendered, racialized
and as existential - the ideological basis of their responses differs, however. The EDL,
BF and For Britain demonstrate the different ways in which discourses of gender and
race intersect, and the impact this has on the appeal of these groups. All draw on class
narratives to construct the authenticity of their positions. However, they do this in dif-
ferent ways. Robinson uses class to deny his position is essentially ideological, or even
political. He characterizes his response as authentic, because it embodies an instinctive,
emotional and working-class masculinity, inaccessible to liberal elites. Robinson suggests
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this masculinity was constructed, not through books or ideology, but through his work-
ing-class upbringing and habitus, which necessitated the performance of a particular
physicality. Projecting the potential to fight was necessary to gain status and avoid vic-
timization, within a working-class environment, he claims. While the reproduction of
this masculinity in EDL demonstration succeeded in mobilizing particular working-class
men, it therefore also alienated broader audiences. Although EDL demonstration has a
reputation for casual violence, Robinson frames the collective demonstrations instead as
an expression of masculine vulnerability, “Every demonstration’s a cry for help” he told
me “But the way we talked and the way I acted - I’m only really appealing to my sort
of people.”54 Robinson’s is a form of compensatory street masculinity: first, from his
perspective, the EDL compensates for the failure of the state as protector; second his
patriarchal value system, which casts English men as protectors of English women,
obliges him to act on this issue. However, although Robinson’s opposition to Islam is
consistent with historic nationalist assertions of a defensive masculinity, it also signals
vulnerability and a primarily ‘authentic’ emotional response to the perceived defilement
of in-group women.
The two female influencers each take a different gendered approach. Fransen’s motiv-
ation is found in her claimed active Catholicism, and belief that Islam is ‘Satanic’.
Fransen takes for granted the masculinity of the BF movement and women’s support of
this. Yet she prioritizes a different form of white working-class masculinity to Robinson:
a militarized, disciplinary vision of activism. She contrasted this with a subordinated
pub-going, football-watching masculinity that she associates with indiscipline, inaction
and ignorance, and the eventual triumph of Islam. It is the British people – particularly
men - and their ‘laziness’ that Fransen blames for the ‘rise of Islam’. She told me,
“People … can’t be bothered, they would rather watch football, or go to the pub, or
watch the X Factor, or go to Legoland. What happens if you’re at Legoland and your
children get blown up?”55 She does not challenge hyper-masculine cultures; instead, she
embodies particular masculinities in order to contrast them with other subordinate
working-class masculinities, such as at EDL protest. She does this in ways that enable
her perceived femininity among supporters to remain intact and which do not disrupt
the strong gender binary of the group, which asserts natural male and female difference.
As a working-class woman fighting for the children of the nation, Fransen has symbolic
value. Indeed, Fransen is frequently framed by fans online as a modern Boadicea, the
historic female leader of the native British resistance against the Romans, and a symbol
she uses on her website.56
Waters’ approach is different again. Waters, as a gay woman, supports a ‘progressive’
secular approach to women’s rights, which she sees threatened by Islam. While she
described the importance of her working-class background, her rhetoric made explicit
appeals to a boundaried feminism excluding Muslims. Her protests included women lead-
ers – one ‘Islam Kills Women’ event for instance included prominent women politicians
from Vlaams Belang, a Flemish radical right group - and this put her in conflict with
others on the radical or far right. She frames her ideology as necessary to fill a feminist
gap in patriot debate. She told me, “… a lot of opponents of Islam have views that I
don’t like. Anne Coulter57 thinks that women should not be allowed to vote! And she’s
got company. … I don’t want those … to be the ones speaking out against Islam.”58
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Waters is the most ideologically committed of the influencers to anti-Islam(ist) activism
as a means of protecting women’s rights. She found the alt-right social media backlash to
women’s equality frustrating and had suffered online abuse from men who, as she said,
“want us back in the kitchen”59
Considering the influencers, there is no clear gender binary of distinct male/female
protected/protector roles, in belief or behavior, no ‘old wine in new bottles’. Women’s
rights do have a key role in discussion. Indeed, masculinities and femininities are not
monolithic, but multiple, even within the clearly binary gender systems of the groups.
Assertions of gender equality are both co-option and enacted in a fragmented gendered
approach. Robinson combines what can be thought of as ‘masculinities of vulnerability’
alongside a more aggressive and confrontational approach, rejecting intellectualism and
favoring ‘authentic’ masculinity constructed within a working class masculinist context.
Fransen meanwhile reproduces confrontational masculine behaviors to prove herself
and shame men to action. Such shaming tactics are evident in a range of ideological
groups, and employed by male leaders and women activists alike, to encourage male
action.60 It should also be noted that there are inherent complexities in the idea of mas-
culinities of vulnerability and care in this context, given, as explored in Part I, national-
ist groups have long constructed masculinities around the ‘protection’ of women.
Anti-Islam(Ism): Wider Activism
Grassroots anti-Islam(ist) participants echo the gendered stance of influencers in the
three ways outlined (working-class muscular masculinity; women’s reproduction of
aggressive masculinities; political assertion of women’s rights). As with the influencers,
the cooption and incorporation of gender equality norms and women’s rights meant the
wider movement demonstrated a fluidity of gendered performances. There are clear ten-
sions with historical far right gender tropes and binaries, delineating male and female
roles. These tensions are evident in both feminized masculinities (the performance by
men of gendered traits historically associated with women and femininity, and deni-
grated in men, such as care, or vulnerability) and female masculinities (the performance
of gendered traits historically associated with men and masculinity, and often denigrated
in women, such as aggression, anger, or open confrontation.)61
Few grassroots activists had engaged with literature on the subject of Islam, which
enabled them to contest the notion that they were ideologically driven, and to reject accu-
sations of Nazism, racism, fascism, or being ‘far-right’. Following the findings of Busher,
participants instead focus on emotional responses to issues, rather than belief. As with the
influencers, there are variations in the cooption of gender, race and class in narratives
expressed by the EDL and by Britain First, as participants react in different ways to par-
ticular gendered behaviors. The accounts explored here indicate the ways in which radical
right activism is produced in the intersections of gendered, raced, classed and faithed iden-
tities. This activism both reproduces patriarchy, but offers possibilities for its contestation.
Gendered Tensions: Pro-Women’s Rights, anti-Feminism
The relationship between gender and the radical right is not straightforwardly binary.
Men and women’s roles are not clearly delineated. Yet gender is fundamentally used to
10 E. PEARSON
construct boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Grassroots anti-Islam(ist)
participants, like the influencers, claimed to represent (particular) women’s rights in
their opposition to Islam. Participants uniformly described Islam as an ‘ideology’ dam-
aging women and the ‘fundamental British value’62 of gender equality. Georgey, who is
in her 30s, previously regularly attended EDL demonstrations. Gender constructed her
response to Islam, with perceived gender difference in everyday practices (habitus) in
her local space a boundary between Muslims and others. Georgey described how a per-
ceived incompatibility of Islam and women’s rights mobilized her, “I see a lot of girls in
prams here with hijab on … just two or three years old. I just despair … We are
allowing society to regress right in front of our eyes and are not doing anything about
it.” Participants believed gendered aspects of Islam could not be reconciled with British
values, and most cited child sexual exploitation and rape as key mobilizing narratives in
their activism. Jason told me, “They molest our children, they run us over with lorries,
they rape our women, they stab our people.” Imagined hyper-sexualized and violent
gendered norms constructed the boundary with idealized secular British norms, posi-
tioned as progressive and equal. Notional ideas of Islam’s sexual norms were used to
define the boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
However, participants did not identify as feminist, and blamed (a notional and mono-
lithic) liberal feminism for a failure to defend nonMuslim British women from Muslim
men. They also believed white liberal elites deprioritized the white working-class. For
participants, this imagined liberal feminism had disrupted a natural gendered logic,
familiar to both nationalist and far right groups: the ability of a narrowly defined
‘nation’ to defend ‘its’ women.63 However, collective ideals and actual behavior diverged.
Participant claims to advocate a women’s rights-based agenda were in tension with an
explicitly anti-feminist stance. Georgey did not consider herself feminist. She described
two tiers of feminists: those fake, self-identifying feminists who appropriate the label to
virtue-signal; and those who reject the title entirely, yet mobilize on protecting women
from the abuses of Islam. While projecting a women’s rights discourse as integral to
their activism, participants also expressed anti-feminist norms that they claimed to
reject in Islam. The tension between proclaimed beliefs about women’s rights and actual
attitudes was most evident in conversation with 19-year-old EDL supporter, Iain, who
believed gendered inequalities in Islam were not ‘British’, yet also told me “A woman
should stay at home and cook and clean, that’s the way I’ve been brought up.” Group
rhetoric on gender equality did not always conform with participants’ views or lives.
Participants who in fact opposed women’s rights nonetheless coopted them in rhet-
oric and discourse. For instance, Jacek, a professional originally from Poland who iden-
tifies with the American alt right, did not believe men and women were equal. He
suggested they were like a lotus (female) and diamond (male). He nonetheless sup-
ported women like Waters simply because he disliked liberal feminists (“feminazis”)
more. However, for Jason, one of the few participants who openly professed to a racial
- and racist - rather than cultural nationalism, a more general contempt for liberal val-
ues encompassed gender equality itself. It is difficult to reconcile Jason’s ideological pos-
ition with that of Georgey or of Waters. The status of women’s rights therefore
represented a point of tension, evidence of fragmentation within the anti-Islam(ism)
movement as a whole. Participants constructed their gendered stance within the
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intersections of their individual lives, collective ideology, and their interaction with
other groups, such as ‘liberal elites’ or the state. For some women the radical right rep-
resented a location for the protection of gender equality, which they felt was endangered
by liberal feminism and Islam; for other activists, the scene was a place for the protec-
tion of ultranationalist patriarchal ideals and the absolute separation of men’s and wom-
en’s roles. These naturally came into conflict with one another.
Challenging the Binary: ‘Caring’ Men and Fighting Women?
As suggested above, the ‘traditional’ separation of gender roles in the ‘old’ far right is
more complex in the radical right explored here. The rigidly patriarchal ideology of far
right tropes is disrupted by the inclusion of a women’s equality narrative, and by par-
ticipant behaviors. This was evident in women’s activism. The body is emphasized by
Bourdieu as one of the primary sites through which symbolic practice or habitus is
communicated.64 Within EDL protest, a physically embodied working-class masculinity
is a means of communicating shared culture, and ideology.65 However, women partici-
pants also physically emulated the confrontational working-class masculinities around
which Robinson suggested the EDL unified. In the radical right, particularly masculine
behaviors were normalized within the groups studied, and the associated practices
adopted by women as well as men. This carried some risk of censure for women from
others in the movement.
This contestation of straightforward assertions of women as in-need-of-protection
was a theme in women’s accounts and evidenced the ways gender and class intersected
to produce their activism. Hel Gower, former personal assistant to Tommy Robinson,
told me it was as important for women to adopt confrontational physicalities and prac-
tices as for men, as part of the symbolic repertoire of the movement, communicating a
class identity. The perceived denigration of the white working-class as ‘second class citi-
zens’ in modern British society was a recruitment narrative.66 This working-class iden-
tity was idealized as “rough and ready”, Gower suggested, “I don’t think growing up in
the East End [of London]67 you can be anything else.” Georgey also nostalgized work-
ing-class identities, including a particular working-class masculinity, which women in
the radical right also adopted. It allowed for status gain, and the further subordination
of Muslim masculinities. Like other forms of ‘lower-class’ male violence, this subordin-
ation through confrontation was performative.68 Georgey for instance said she had chal-
lenged Anjem Choudary during street dawah, a confrontation she was particularly
proud of as she believed it subverted Muslim gender roles. Georgey had thousands of
Twitter followers and regularly contested essentialized gender roles requiring women to
accept male protection in the online space, and also trolled social media users defending
Islam. Such expressions of female aggression appeared to be both accepted and often
praised by men in the homosocial scene.
The incorporation noted by Spierings and Zaslove of two conflicting gendered ideolo-
gies into the radical right – traditional patriarchy and progressive gender equality – ren-
ders the ‘doing’ of radical right activism complex, with activist accounts showing the
complexity of gender in their behavior. This was evident in the ways in which narratives
of gender equality enabled men to reframe traditional ‘protector’ masculinities as more
(feminized) masculinities of care and vulnerability, recognizing and incorporating
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women’s agency. For instance, in June 2017, former football hooligan John Meighan
staged the first Football Lads Alliance march in London, at which several thousand pre-
dominantly male protesters marched against Islamist extremism. Meighan wanted to
exploit existing football cultures of masculine working-class protest, but also to appeal
to families. In particular, both Meighan and another participant, former EDL activist
and football hooligan, Alex, regarded their activism as the manifestation of social con-
science, channeling football violence into ‘good’. Other male participants also outlined
how their involvement in anti-Islam(ist) protest represented a (clearly boundaried to
non-Muslims) form of care, through activism aimed at helping the (nonMuslim) home-
less, veterans or (nonMuslim) women affected by grooming by particular men. Indeed,
activism as shared endeavor gave even violence a moral and educative purpose. They
reframed homosocial activism as masculinized forms of care and vulnerability, echoing
Robinson’s narrative in the previous section, and revealing a more complex – less essen-
tialized - masculinity than the strictly dichotomous gendered logic of the ‘old’ far right
suggests. This allowed them to justify what, essentially, remained highly gendered and
racialized activism.
Islamism: Gendered Logics: Gendered Response
This section considers gender in Islamist belief and behaviors, and the differences
between these and the radical right. First, it outlines a more clear-cut essentialism than
in the radical right participants, rooted in a stricter adherence to the gender-divided
roles set out in Islamist ideology. Indeed, unlike in the radical right, ideology, scholar-
ship and ideological knowledge have a gendered role, endowing particular forms of
masculine status. There is also a greater coherence around specific ideological positions
among Islamists than for the anti-Islam(ist) activists, who demonstrate a range of gen-
dered activisms. “As Hegghammer has emphasized, ideology is not simply ‘belief sys-
tem’, it is ‘doctrine and aesthetics’”.69 Within ALM, this consists of symbolic practices
that communicate membership of a shared community.70 This means a lack of ‘book
learning’ is less important than the ability to utilize a particular discourse to be recog-
nized by others as a ‘like-mind’. The second part of this section then emphasizes the
diversity of masculine performances as symbolic practice that ideology enables, includ-
ing scholarly and ‘caring’ masculinities. These, to some degree, are shared with men in
the radical right; yet while radical right men emphasize care as a product of class, for
the men here, care is linked explicitly to ideology. What is important throughout is that
participants construct their extremism in the intersections of the hybridity of their iden-
tities: their Islamic knowledge, their response to secularism, and their understanding of
gender, particularly relating to sexual norms.
Gender Binaries: Male Warriors and Female Honor
Gender functions in Islamist ideology to create boundaries. Differences in social and
sexual norms were cited by all the participants as a distinct and untraversable boundary
between secular society, and the ALM in-group. For leader Anjem Choudary, and con-
sistent with Islamist ideologues such as Qutb, sexual morality and sexual norms marked
a barrier between Islam and a corrupt West. The apparent sexual degeneracy of the
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West is, for Choudary, evidence that the underlying principles of the system are incor-
rect. Secular society has permitted practices which contravene the domestic roles imag-
ined by Qutb for Muslim women. Choudary said, “… for women, living in the West,
they are used to exploitation. … naked women on billboards… All of this exploitation
… – it would be eradicated in Islam… where the man and woman are equal before
God… [and] women are elevated – they’re mothers, they’re sisters, they’re aunts,
they’re nieces, they’re daughters.”71 Women and men are fundamentally different, he
suggests, and it is “common sense” for men to want primarily to protect them. 72 This
essentialism ensures that it is men who alone have access to the highest status role
(warrior) in times of conflict, and women gain status through their relationship with
him, “Definitely in Islam, you know, the mujahid [warrior] is a very honorable person.
Why should not people [sic] want to get married to people like that? ..- .. very honor-
able people who sacrifice their lives for what they believe in.”73 Choudary also suggested
ALM ideology occupies not a different, but a parallel gendered space, in which the
mujahid has the high status of a (secular) fireman or soldier. ALM therefore represents
a group in which Muslims who do not believe in secularity are able to find equivalent,
but more appropriate, masculine roles.
Participants largely adhered to Choudary’s vision of the gender binary of separated
roles for men and women as both producing a boundary with the (immoral) secular
space, and guiding relations within Islam and their own practices. This patriarchal bin-
ary, separating roles and ensuring men’s protection of women, was firstly evident in my
relative lack of access to women activists, and also in women’s complete lack of visibil-
ity in leadership roles. Women were not at the court cases I attended, nor were they
participants in the street dawah that I saw, despite their broader activism within the
group.74 All of the male participants but Rifat were married, and mainly to women who
shared their faith and beliefs, they told me.75 Despite numerous requests to meet wives
who were fellow activists, the group would not permit this as they regarded women as
particularly vulnerable at that time.
Mirroring the mobilization of the radical right around issues of perceived sexual dif-
ference and gender norms, Islamist participants were also motivated to ALM activism
by opposition to the perceived sexual immorality of secular society. Mo, a convert in
his 20s, and part of Choudary’s circle, believes women only have rights in Islam. He
distinguishes between the passivity of women in Islam, treated as a ‘diamond’, and their
immoral assertiveness elsewhere. Meeting one evening, he described his journey in des-
pair, a woman “… just drunk, out of her face in the street.”76 Participants believe their
faith requires a response to such perceived immorality. Faith dictates all action. Faith
was not a mask for other issues; it was indistinguishable from them, framed as the only
means to enact system change. Rifat for instance told me Islam was about action,
“… both public and private [Islam was about] the issue of evil. Rape, drugs, prostitu-
tion. Or domestic violence.” For Rifat, gendered inequality is a social injustice around
which to mobilize faith, according to the gendered binary constructed by ALM. This
cohered to cultural ideas of gender difference he described as part of his community
habitus growing up. He believed this gendered habitus was incompatible with what he
considered to be uniform secular norms. Some of this mobilization of faith was con-
frontational and hyper-masculine. Mo, for instance, had been involved in so-called
‘Muslim Patrol’ in an effort to prevent public immorality, confronting people he
14 E. PEARSON
considered to be affronting Islamic morality in public spaces. This led to prison, where,
given his ‘terrorist’ designation, he enjoyed a high masculine status, he told me, with
both friends, and acolytes.
Gendered Identities: Binary Blurred?
While participants were clear on the necessity of a gendered binary, and what Mattheis
and Winter term the ‘complementarity’ of men’s and women’s roles,77 participant
behaviors and responses were less clear-cut, and in two ways. First, given they con-
structed activist identities at the intersections of different social fields to which they
belonged, their relationship with ‘western feminism’ was not straightforward. Two
women I spoke to co-opted secular feminist narratives, for instance, even as they also
explicitly opposed them. Second, hallowed Islamist protector and ‘warrior’ or mujahid
masculinities permitted what was in practice a range of masculine performance, some
feminized. These were positioned as consistent with the internal group ideology.
As in the radical right, participant ideals and action were not consistent. Islamist par-
ticipants opposed (a monolithic) secular feminism as wrong, and unnecessary, given
their belief in Islam as a practice and ideology that enshrines women’s rights. Akash
explicitly challenged what he termed “western feminism” because he felt it always
sought to emasculate men, and blame them for problems between the sexes. Such views
were common. However, the few female participants expressed a more complex rela-
tionship, drawing on different aspects of their ultimately British identities to produce
their adherence to the movement. Saleha, formerly a teenage supporter of Daesh and
connected to Choudary’s online networks, described her move away from secular femin-
ism as part of her journey to Islamism, “I was one at first [a feminist]. Then I realized
it was wrong … and so I rejected it.” However, Saleha went on to suggest her attitude
toward Western feminism was a product of social stigma in her wider Muslim commu-
nity, rather than belief, “If I as a Muslim said I was into feminism, then I would have
got so much hate … you’re a slag, you’re this, you’re supporting British ideology. And
if I did that, then my reputation would be diminished.”78 Similarly, Aisha, caring for
her small children while her husband was in prison for terrorism offenses framed her
adherence to Islamism in feminist terms, borrowing from the ‘rights’ discourse of secu-
larism to do so, “Happily, I say I obey my husband. It doesn’t sit well with feminists.
But I like to think of myself as a feminist. But maybe not the same type.”79 Aisha
employed a secular framing of gendered relations, even while rejecting secularism, and
used this to emphasize her agency in adopting a relationship of submission toward her
husband. Like other Salafi women, Aisha asserts her agency within the strictly gendered
practices of her faith.80
As Lahoud, and also Pearson and Winterbotham have noted, Islamist narratives can
enable women to challenge mainstream (Western) narratives of the meaning of
empowerment and subjugation, rendering the terms relative, a question of framing.81
Indeed, women constructed their adherence to the ALM network through a prism of
race, faith, gender and a British feminism they sought to reject. Additionally, and in a
counterpoint to the anti-Islam(ist) depiction of Islam as a site of oppression for women,
Rifat suggested ALM functioned as a form of refuge for convert women to escape the
patriarchal abuses of secular society, women who were “beaten by brothers and fathers,
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their faith insulted.”82 The reversion of white nonMuslim women to Islam enabled
another gender narrative: the superiority of Muslim men, Islamic culture, and Muslim
masculinities. Female (particularly white) reverts were symbolically useful to emasculate
nonMuslim men. Rifat said, “An EDL guy, he said, you guys love wearing dresses. We
said, your wife prefers a Muslim guy rather than one of you.”83 Women’s (private) sex-
ual relationships are instrumentalized to prove collective dominance over out-group
men. Indeed, this exchange evidences the ways in which both groups instrumentalize
women to emasculate the other.
The second way in which the clear gender binary of ALM was disrupted was in the
range of roles adopted by men, particularly those demonstrating emotional lability.
Hegghammer has noted the importance of displays of sensitivity to jihadist men, and that
was evident here.84 These displays included both caring and scholarly masculinities,
alongside masculinities of vulnerability. Men described being prompted to tears by news
footage of abuses of children in Syria, their emotional responses then prompting a desire
for action and for learning about the types of appropriate action. While anti-Islam(ist)
activists rejected associations with ideology, the acquisition of Islamic knowledge in and
of itself gives ALM and networked participants masculine status. When Zakir went on
trial for funding terrorism, he described how only knowledge of and adherence to the
strict rules of jihad give a fighter the authority of Islam, and honor of being a warrior,
rather than a simple killer. Knowledge of key Quranic concepts, the teachings of particu-
lar scholars, the rules of violence, as well as that violence itself, all contributed together to
the production of a particular masculine status. Yet high status masculinities of violent
jihad were both complemented and enabled by masculinities of care and sensitivity. Zakir
was mobilized to fund his friend in part because of videos of brutalities against children,
he told me, videos he described to me with tears in his eyes. The power of these images
is not just the humiliation of Muslim women and children, and the injustice they repre-
sent, but in evoking a particular emotional masculinity, which in turn produces warrior
masculinities as response. The ultimate aim of this process – violence, for the right rea-
sons - mitigates any potential weakness in tears or sadness.
Part III: Conclusions
This paper considered the role of gender in constructing belief in the U.K.’s
anti-Islam(ism) movement, and in an Islamist network linked to Anjem Choudary and al-
Muhajiroun. It considered the degree to which participants adhere to an ideological gen-
der binary, with rigid and essentialized roles for women and men, and the degree to
which that is disrupted in practice. It provides an empirical account of the realities of
group members’ understanding of ideological and propaganda narratives, and the ways in
which their interpretations and performances puncture or adhere to those discourses.
Importantly this exposes the ways in which the practical exigencies of daily action under-
cut group ideals. It also suggests the co-constitutional and mutually reinforcing relation-
ships between the varied forms of power hierarchies evident in participant interviews,
codified by discourses and practices of gender, race and class, amongst other factors. As
such it perhaps raises more questions than answers about the fluctuations and differences
between groups, and the kinds of contrasting gendered performances evident within them.
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Both movements considered here are homosocial. They have broadly masculinist and
patriarchal cultures and habitus, which dictate and limit the ways in men and women
can participate. The literature on both suggests they share features: the segregation of
complementary gender roles (gender binary); an emphasis on domesticity; and a rever-
ence for patriarchy. This paper shows that there are ways in which the two movements
resemble one another, given the patriarchal foundations of both; but it argues against a
straightforward reading of activists as embodiments of the same problematic attitudes to
women, or gender. There are clear differences between them, and particularly in the
anti-Islam(ist) scene, there is great diversity in the gendered approaches of different
leaders and groups, and possibilities for women.
There are particular tensions regarding the scope and extent of women’s participa-
tion. The absence of uniformity is apparent within, as well as between groups. The piece
explored the relatively incoherent gendered picture emergent in the radical right. While
participants generally adhere to essentialized notions of male and female roles, consist-
ent with historic nationalism, the picture is not clear-cut. Both influencers and to some
degree grassroots activists in the radical right participant group demonstrate varying
approaches to gender norms and the role of women, echoing the gendered tensions
identified by Spierings and Zaslove.85 A conservative reliance on patriarchal traditional
norms aimed at preserving the integrity of the racialized nation, which can be based on
Christian ideals, is at odds with a more progressive ideology, highlighting women’s
rights.86 This presents an ideological fracture, around which it is difficult for the various
strands of the anti-Islam(ism) scene to unite. The fracture separates a movement such
as the EDL from more ‘traditionally’ far right groups including Britain First, or white
supremacists in the United States, or indeed sections of the alt-right.87 Some anti-
Islam(ism) participants do take the notion of women’s rights seriously; contrary to
Feldman or Jackson, this is not simply ‘old wine in new bottles’.88
Lange and M€ugge have indicated that the role of women in right-wing populist
movements is ambiguous and wide-ranging. This is supported here.89 Women are found
in leadership roles, unlike in the Islamist movement, and they adopt masculine practices
and identities; however, this does not mean they contest patriarchal norms. As in other
nationalist movements, some women here clearly support patriarchal values.90 Women
can wield power and adopt masculine behaviors, but to do so risks conflict with domin-
ant masculine and patriarchal values and norms and a degree of censure.
Due to ethical constraints prohibiting discussion of Daesh, conversation with
Islamists about belief was difficult. Islamists discussed broader themes, including a bin-
ary logic governing gender roles, which they supported. The literature on Islamism
notes the ways in which masculinist norms dominate Islamist ideology;91 not surpris-
ingly, this is reflected here. Nonetheless, participants constructed their activism not
solely around ideology, but in the intersections between ideology and their often hybrid
identities. This meant participants’ actions and narratives sometimes undercut ideology.
Women linked to Choudary’s circle, for instance, both contested and reclaimed the
meaning of secular feminism, as women and men did in the radical right. Strategies
used to uphold fundamentally patriarchal belief systems, central to which is the idea of
the male necessity to protect women are rebranded as furthering female agency. This
has appeal to both men and women, even if it does not give women power, or challenge
patriarchy.
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Considering both movements, the range of masculinities accepted is perhaps broader
than suggested in the literature, which emphasizes the importance of violent masculin-
ities to gain status.92 However, while a robust and combative masculinity is apparent
in both movements, this is complemented by an emotionally labile sensitivity. In both
movements, it is clear that where women are active, even as leaders, in the radical
right, patriarchal norms and habitus constantly threaten women’s participatory
powers, on their own terms. Nonetheless, there is no straightforward replication of
gender norms across the masculinities in both movements. In particular, ‘ideology’
has a different cultural role. The ‘Sheikh’ or male scholar is revered in Islam, and
Islamist participants sought to demonstrate learning. This is important to distinguish
the virtuous warrior from, as Zakir suggests, a mere killer. It is therefore important
for Islamists to display their ideological status through cultural practices, as
Hegghammer has noted.93 In the anti-Islam(ist) radical right meanwhile, an explicitly
ideological position is equated with inauthenticity, and easy accusations of racism.
Their activism more closely resembles Busher’s finding of support for ‘themes’ and a
deemphasis of strict ‘ideology’.94
The piece ultimately argues, therefore, that the complementarity of gendered roles in
these movements cannot be uniformly assumed, and nor should this assumption
underly counter-extremism responses. Additionally, while the radical right and al-
Muhajiroun networks explored here do share some gendered features, much separates
them. In the West, particularly, it is important to recognize that while Salafi-jihadist
ideology opposes secular gendered national values, in practice, individuals also appear
to incorporate these to some degree, because they are British. Meanwhile, radical right
ideologies and practices are often shared with national institutional values, and histor-
ical assertions of identity. The different positionality of each movement relative to main-
stream and state gendered discourses is a crucial distinction. Recognition of this is
particularly important, because different forms of extremism require tailor-made coun-
ter-extremism responses. Policy to counter the far right is unlikely to work if it simply
replicates that used against Islamist extremism.95
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